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Abstract
The article argues for a cultural turn in the study of populist politics in Europe. Integrating insights from three fields—
political sociology, political psychology, and media studies—a new, multi-disciplinary framework is proposed to theorize
particular cultural conditions favorable to the electoral success of populist parties. Through this lens, the fourth wave of
populism should be viewed as a “noisy”, anti-cosmopolitan counter-revolution in defense of traditional cultural identity.
Reflective of a deep-seated, value-based great divide in European democracies that largely trumps economic cleavages,
populist parties first and foremost politically mobilize long lingering cultural discontent and successfully express a backlash
against cultural change. While the populist counter-revolution is engendered by profoundly transformed communicative
conditions in the age of social media, its emotional force can best be theorized with the political psychology of authoritar-
ianism: as a new type of authoritarian cultural revolt.
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1. Introduction: Reframing Populist Politics within
Liberal Democracies
Populist actors have unsettled and begun reshaping Eu-
ropean party systems and democracy. In recent election
cycles, populist political parties like Fidesz—Hungarian
Civic Alliance (since 2010) and the PiS (Law and Jus-
tice) in Poland consolidated or gained government posi-
tions in Eastern Europe. Following West European elec-
tions in 2017, the French Front National, the Dutch Par-
tij Voor de Vrijheit (PVV) and the German Alternative
für Deutschland (AfD)—the latter entering parliament
for the first time and immediately becoming the third
largest party—are now main opposition parties, chal-
lengingmainstream competitors but also the very frame-
work of existing constitutional liberal democracies.
In response to their electoral performances and suc-
cesses, illiberal populist actors are the subject of schol-
arly interest that is growing on an almost exponential
scale. Yet, because such efforts are often confined to
examining agents, political opportunity structures, voter
preferences, and party system change, even innovative
research exploring causal mechanisms may miss the
scope and depth of cultural undercurrents driving pop-
ulist success. This article suggests that the puzzling cross-
national ascendancy of populist actors should be ex-
plored in the context of profound politico-cultural trans-
formations and conflicts within liberal democracies. Op-
posing established parties in both their formand content,
populist actors understand themselves as movement-
parties that primarily express—and often successfully ap-
peal to—cultural discontent and identity concerns rather
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than proposing specific political or economic goals. Re-
search thus needs to respond to this self-understanding
reflected in parties and their voters (Taub, 2017), and
theorize the broader underlying cultural conditions, con-
flicts, and dynamics at play in populist mobilizations.
The article argues for a “cultural turn” in the study of
contemporary populist politics. In so doing, it advances
a novel, expanded theoretical framework. It is based on
three interlinked components and claims that integrate
and build upon initial findings from three disciplinary
perspectives hitherto underrepresented in research on
populist politics in Europe: political sociology, political
psychology, and media studies. Such an expanded view
points to an interrelated set of theoretical arguments
on broader cultural—specifically socio-cultural, politico-
psychological, and communicative—conditions and dy-
namics we deem crucial for explaining the current suc-
cess of populist actors. The goal of this article is to
bring these perspectives into substantive conversation,
and to initiate a multi-disciplinary theoretical reframing
for the study of contemporary populism that expands
political science research by integrating insights from
the respective fields. Such a multi-disciplinary, theory-
guided perspective on populist politics in the context of
politico-cultural and societal undercurrents takes inspi-
ration from Frankfurt School critical theory, and espe-
cially their studies on authoritarianism, identity, and the
communication of prejudice. Their theoretical models fo-
cus on illuminating the societal reproduction of persis-
tent streaks of authoritarianism within the political cul-
tures of politicalmodernitywhich aremobilized time and
again and recurringly challenge the boundaries of mod-
ern constitutional democracies (Rensmann, 2017).1
Substantively, this article thereby aims to concep-
tualize the populist phenomenon as an authoritarian-
nativist cultural counter-revolution, as well as to theo-
rize both transformed and persistent politico-cultural ori-
gins of the recent electoral boost of populist parties. The
theoretical argument is three-fold: first, it is suggested
that populists can benefit from and mobilize a no longer
“silent” counter-revolution (Ignazi, 1992, 2003). The pop-
ulists’ appeal is primarily cultural: it thrives on a long
lingering, increasingly polarized “great divide”, or clash
within civilizations, based on social value and cultural
identity conflicts in post-industrial European societies.
This divide is arguably more profound than political so-
ciologists assume, who rightly diagnose a socio-cultural
backlash (Alexander & Welzel, 2017; Inglehart & Nor-
ris, 2016).
Second, the cultural counter-revolution is theorized
by employing new and classical authoritarianism theory,
especially political-psychological models of authoritarian
rebellion (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & San-
ford, 1950). The “noisy” counter-revolution is conceived
as a transgressive, authoritarian revolt directed against
liberal-cosmopolitan socio-cultural transformations and
culturally inclusive identities in globalized immigration
societies—and against immigrants and “the elite” iden-
tified with those changes.
Third, theorizing initial findings from media studies,
it is argued that the new social media culture and its dis-
intermediated political communication patterns have
helped erode boundaries of civil and factual discourse in
political culture, propelling populist actors, their claims,
and their authoritarian politics of transgression against
norms of liberal democracy.
After reconceptualizing the ideological core of Eu-
ropean populist movement-parties, each of the three
proposed arguments about cultural conditions for the
electoral success of populist politics is subsequently un-
packed and molded into substantiated, interrelated the-
oretical claims. In so doing, the article points to an inte-
grated new framework preparing a cultural turn in the
study of populism in Europe. Rather then isolating or op-
erationalizing specific hypotheses and testing them, ini-
tial research from three bodies of disciplinary literature
is critically synthesized to advance a novel cultural per-
spective and lay out potential lines for future inquiry.
2. Parties and Movements: Reconceptualizing Populist
Actors and their Cultural Appeal
Research has demonstrated that “populism” is well
suited to understanding key features of the most sig-
nificant movement-parties challenging European party
systems today (Mudde, 2005, 2007; Müller, 2016; Rens-
mann, 2006). Yet, conceptualizations of electorally rel-
evant European populist parties need to pay more at-
tention to the cultural core of their ideological appeal:
First and foremost, European populist parties—left and
right—express and articulate cultural discontent and par-
ticular(istic) notions of cultural identity, a widely shared
feeling of unease with globalized immigration societies
and their elites, rather than specific political goals or a
coherent ideology. These parties, it is argued here, ide-
ologically point to a cultural counter-revolution (Ignazi,
2003) against established politics and society as much as
a political one. A re-conceptualization of their ideologi-
cal core should build on previous ideational definitions,
but needs to further elaborate their cultural appeal, com-
monly categorized as authoritarian and nativist.
Following Cas Mudde (2005, 2007), populism func-
tions as a “thin-centered ideology” that almost always
appears attached to other ideological traits. Populism is
marked by constructing stark group dichotomies: It con-
siders society as separated into two antagonistic camps,
“the (pure) people” versus “the (corrupt) elite”, while the
latter allegedly victimizes the former (Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6). Often employing a specific “im-
age of the vox populi” as a particular, sharply demar-
1 The proposed new framework advancing a ‘cultural turn’ in populism studies also builds on my previous research into the emergence and political
potential of the socio-cultural divide currently reshaping party politics in liberal democracies. Populist politics often failed only because of leadership
failures and organizational factors, not because of a lack of politico-cultural potential (Rensmann, 2006, 2011, 2012).
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 123–135 124
cated, homogenous identity, populists argue that democ-
racy should be a direct expression of a presumed “gen-
eral will” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 20). Thus
populism implies a distinct ideological contrast to plural-
ism; and, we would add, to liberal constitutionalismwith
its universalistic underpinnings, focus on separation of
powers, and individual civil rights.
While this ideological profile can apply to a variety of
political actors, movements or parties, it is not grasped
in formal conceptualizations of populism as a specific
type of mobilization, leadership style, or discursive strat-
egy (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 19). The con-
structed vertical dichotomy between “the corrupt elite”
and “the pure people”, which can be seen as populism’s
core feature, may also appear inmainstream politics. For
actors and parties which can be classified as populist,
this binary anti-elitism, or anti-pluralist dichotomy, is a
constitutive part of their ideology. Yet the implicitly anti-
universalistic, anti-pluralistic notion of “the good people”
as an homogenous identity also automatically carries cul-
tural weight that is overlooked byMudde and Rovira Kalt-
wasser: it presupposes the defense of cultural identity,
and appeals to cultural discontent with perceived liberal
rule. This includes “left” populist movement-parties like
La France Insoumise led by former socialist Jean-Luc Mé-
lenchon,who opposes refugees and reiteratedMarine Le
Pen’s claim that the French nation shares no responsibil-
ity for the Vichy regime’s crimes (Haaretz, 2017).2
Linked to this not quite as “thin” but implicitly
culturally charged ideological center, most European
populist parties also employ a second, horizontal di-
chotomy that is heavily culturally biased—an antago-
nism of “us” versus “the others”, the “nation” against mi-
norities, (im)migrants, refugees,Muslims, Jews, and “for-
eign powers” (Greven, 2016; Rensmann, 2006). Distinc-
tively nativist (Mudde, 2007), they employ a specific, ex-
clusionary conception of the people as a culturally or eth-
nically homogenous nation that is contrasted to antago-
nistic, demonized outgroups (Greven, 2016, p. 5). Who-
ever is construed as not “truly” belonging to “the peo-
ple” is blamed for its problems, if not viewed as an “en-
emy of the people”. While often migrants are targeted,
those constructed as “others” can vary. All populist ac-
tors have attacked the “globalist elite” and supported
some level of national economic protectionism, tradi-
tionally associated with “the left” (Kriesi, 2014; Rens-
mann, 2011). Our reconceptualization of populist par-
ties takes into account that this overtly cultural, hori-
zontal dichotomy between “the good people” and non-
native outgroups representing globalization is not lim-
ited to right-wing populists. Neither are conspiratorial
views of globalization as a zero-sum game favoring “the
global elite” and rendering “the people” as losers. In fact,
distinctions between left and right populism based on
the criterion nativism vs. cosmopolitanism are compli-
cated and difficult to empirically substantiate, at least
in the European context. Several left-wing populists in
Europe, from the German Left Party to La France In-
soumise, share nativist, anti-cosmopolitan sentiments,
advocate national protectionism, and target presumably
all-powerful external global forces for victimizing “the
nation” (Hartleb, 2017).3
Further complicating traditional left/right divides,
authoritarian features constitute a third ideological trait
displayed among most populist actors today (Mudde,
2007). Negative political communication (Greven, 2016,
p. 1) and apocalyptic crisis discourses, characteristic for
populists from the Movimento Cinque Stelle to the AfD
(Decker, 2016), are linked to calls for authoritarian so-
lutions. Authoritarianism as an ideological feature—in
contrast to political-psychological explanatory models,
to which we turn later—is hereby understood as sup-
port for illiberal, top-downdecision-making allowing for
measures such as suspending the rule of law or con-
stitutional rights, democratic deliberation, liberal pro-
cedural norms, and institutionalized separation of pow-
ers. The common support for authoritarianism has an
affinity to the populists’ anti-pluralistic, homogenized,
culturally biased concept of “the people”, as they claim
to represent “the people themselves”, understood as
a symbolic, fictional body constituted “outside existing
democratic procedures” (Müller, 2016, p. 27). To be
sure, seeking to mobilize bottom-up “movements” and
“culture” against an allegedly “broken” liberal govern-
ment rather than aiming to govern lawful institutions,
European populists thereby do not fashion themselves
as regular electoral competitors, but as agents of “true”
or “illiberal democracy” (Viktor Orbán). This may en-
tail granting unrestricted authority to a leader articu-
lating unfiltered sentiments of an imagined vox populi,
by virtue of a certain culture or group membership, or
the ratification of illiberal political measures by refer-
enda that suggest direct democratic mandates (Müller,
2016, p. 29).
Integrating Mudde’s ideational definition as a thin-
centered ideology based on an “elite–people” di-
chotomy, the proposed re-conceptualization of contem-
porary European populist actors, parties, and move-
ments views cultural underpinnings as crucial to under-
stand populist ideology and appeal: cultural bias, iden-
tity, and sentiments are a constitutive ideological un-
dercurrent.4 It largely suspends left–right distinctions—
despite their ongoing relevance in self-understandings
of different political milieus, and notwithstanding some
2 The case of Mélenchon shows that both anti-immigrant rhetoric and the revisionist downplaying of a national past tainted by Nazi crimes and col-
laborations (in order to absolve “the people” from criminal responsibility and to advance national myth-making) are not exclusive features of the
radical right.
3 Only Greek Syriza and the Spanish Podemos decidedly support immigration, and only the latter opposes Euro-scepticism, which cuts across left–right
divides (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, 2011).
4 Hans-Georg Betz observed an “identitarian turn” and respective programmatic convergences of populist parties in the 1990s, if programmatic contrasts
among them were ever that stark as some early country-specific studies of opportunity sturctures had suggested (Betz, 2004; Bornschier, 2010b, p. 3).
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policy differences.5 Despite their cross-national distinc-
tions, however, all “right-wing” and most “left-wing”
populist actors share key common ideological denom-
inators shaped by authoritarianism, anti-liberal, anti-
pluralistic vertical and horizontal dichotomies, which im-
plicitly or explicitly endorse cultural exclusivity, identity,
and denigration of “others”. Conceptualizing European
populist parties this way, they can be understood as po-
litical articulations and mobilizations of an illiberal, cul-
turally charged authoritarian-nativist counter-revolution
against liberal democracy, inclusive cultural diversity,
and cosmopolitan social value change.6
3. A Silent Counter-Revolution Turned Noisy: Populist
Contestations of Cosmopolitan Value Change as
Expressions of a Socio-Cultural Divide
To better explain the origins and appeal of this politico-
cultural counter-revolution ideologically mobilized by
populist parties, it should be framed in the context of a
socio-cultural “great divide” restructuring political com-
petition in European democracies. The populist resur-
gence, it is argued here, points to deep-seated and now
salient cultural conflicts on collective identity and societal
values within society that have previously been underes-
timated in empirical research and theoretical models.
Structural/institutional approaches examining elec-
toral market competition and the erosion of “frozen”
party systems help address improved political opportu-
nity structures for newcomers in light of shrinking sup-
port for catch-all parties, especially on the center-left. Yet
they largely fail to grasp the specific causes that benefit
populist parties especially, as they pay too little attention
to ideological content. Why don’t they favor green, anti-
authoritarian, or new socialist parties (Kriesi, 2014; Muis
& Immerzeel, 2017)? Agency-centered supply-side ap-
proaches, which focus on party organization, agent strat-
egy, and platformmodernizations—or the lack thereof—
are good at explaining cross-national variation and
volatility (Art, 2011;Mudde, 2007; Rensmann, 2012), yet
add little to explain the largely synchronous success of
“fourth wave” populism (Mudde, 2013).
Demographic demand-side explanations face limita-
tions because support for populist actors tends to cut
across various groups, although there are some rele-
vant correlations. Male support for authoritarian pop-
ulist parties is generally stronger—according to research
by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, the AfD received 16% of
the male but only 9% of the female vote (2017 over-
all: 12.6%). While there is little variation between young
and old voters, the AfD (and other populist parties) is do-
ing slightly better amongmiddle aged groups (Naumann,
2017).7 The most reliable demographic predictor is edu-
cation. Populist parties tend to do better among voters
with low levels of education. A striking example is the
French Front National, supported by up to 50% of likely
voters without high school degree, in contrast to 16%
with academic degree (Les Echos, 2015).
Explanations that focus on economic factors (relative
social deprivation, unemployment, and economic crisis,
etc.) largely fall short of yielding robust findings with-
out accounting for a variety of contextual and other fac-
tors (Arzheimer, 2009). Guiso, Herrera andMorelli (2017)
suggest economic security directly affects intentions to
vote for populist parties, though this is mitigated by eco-
nomic shocks, which tend to discourage actual voter
turn-out. KoenDamhuis’s study of PVV voters (2017) con-
firms that they include a broad spectrum of social strata.
Hence, the AfD is almost equally supported by all social
strata—with the exception, however, of blue-collar work-
ers, 19%ofwhomvoted for the populist party (compared
to 12.6% overall).8 Mirroring the results of the Frank-
furt School’s research on likely fascist voters in the 1920s,
some (though not all) studies also show that populist sup-
port tends to be disproportionately high among small
business owners and blue-collar workers, or economic
“globalization losers” (Kriesi et al., 2006). Be that as it
may, there are few indicators that such relative working
class support is based on economic issues—even though
neo-liberal austerity policies affect workers.
Rather, evidence from AfD voters indicates that cul-
tural issues—the protection of national cultural identity,
allegedly threatened by (Muslim) immigrants and the in-
flux of refugees, opposition to “cosmopolitan” elite cul-
ture, and the rejection of progressive social value change
—are salient among all AfD supporters (Taub, 2017). Only
14%of AfD voters prefer Germany to be an open-minded,
cosmopolitan country, in contrast to the majority among
voters of other parties (Naumann, 2017).9 Anti-cosmo-
połitan, authoritarian-nativist cultural attitudes are by
5 While radical right and left are still relevant analytical categories, the new patterns point to constitutive similarities among populist parties, rendering
these distinctions less relevant in view of ideological features, platforms, and voters.Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s distinctions between “exclusionary”
versus “inclusionary” populism (2013) may be more useful, though most populist parties in Europe are not inclusionary. When analyzing particularism–
universalism, nationalism–cosmopolitanism, authoritarianism–liberalism divides, most populist parties, “left” and “right”, are today linked to the first
side of these divisions, opposing, in the words of left-wing Brexit supporter Alan Johnson, the “Davos man” and “the globalist elite” (Johnson, 2017).
6 Jeremy Corbyn’s attempt to transform the British Labor Party, traditionally center-left, into a populist movement-party (with the support of “Momen-
tum”, a movement-organization within the party founded in 2015), is a case in point. He does not just consistently employ populist vertical anti-elite di-
chotomies (“themany” versus “the few”) but alsohorizontal dichotomies (e.g. blaming the EU for British neo-liberal policy and supporting anti-immigrant
policy to allegedly protect domestic wages; Chakelian, 2017). He also has a decidedly authoritarian streak, displayed in support for authoritarian regimes
in Venezuela, Iran and Russia and violent groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and the IRA (Hirsh, 2017).
7 An outlier is France: Only 20% of voters over 65, but 44% of 18 to 24-year-olds backed Front National leader Le Pen in the second round of the presiden-
tial election (Kentish, 2017). The data on the AfD are based on a combination of a telephone survey among 1,666 randomly selected eligible voters one
week before the 2017 national parliamentary election, and of a survey of 41,334 voters on the day of the election, both conducted by Forschungsgruppe
Wahlen. The French data are based on a survey among 2,797 eligible voters, conducted by IFOP in March 2015.
8 On the survey data see footnote 7.
9 See footnote 7.
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far the most reliable predictors of populist voting. This
is why political sociology that explores the evolution of
conflicts on cultural values and identities offers the most
promising direction to theorize populist success.
Four decades ago, Ronald Inglehart observed a
“silent revolution” of post-material social value change
as an effect of economic modernization and stability
(Inglehart, 1977). Overall, cultural change has further
progressed towards the increased acceptance of inclu-
sive liberal-cosmopolitan and individual self-expression
values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), particularly striking
among younger generational cohorts in increasingly cul-
turally diversified, post-industrial democracies (Inglehart
& Norris, 2009). The social value revolution eventually
resonated in platforms and policies of mainstream par-
ties (even if to varying degrees cross-nationally), leading
to a recently accelerated cultural “cosmopolitanization
of European party politics” (Rensmann, 2014).
Yet this cultural change has not been uncontested.
Following the initial rise of “post-material” left and green
parties representing social value change, Piero Ignazi
suggests a wave of radical right success in the 1980s
and 1990s benefited from a “silent counter-revolution”
(1992, 2003), understood as a cultural backlash against
social value change and demographic shifts related to
immigration. Although it often became politically man-
ifest only in short-lived protest votes and fluctuating
performances of radical right populist parties, the so-
cietal undercurrent of the cultural counter-revolution
has lingered on. Rather than disappearing, it has now
fully translated from silent value opposition among rel-
evant segments of voters and non-voters into robust
support of outspoken, politically and electorally relevant
movement-parties.
Indeed, new research indicates that the backlash
stabilized and helped polarize political conflict along an
increasingly salient great cultural dividewithin European
democracies: a divide between liberal-cosmopolitan and
authoritarian-nativist social values, or cosmopolitanism
vs. nationalism, which largely trumps socio-economic
cleavages (Bornschier, 2010a; Inglehart & Norris, 2016;
Kaldor, 1997; Rensmann, 2011).10 Inglehart and Norris
demonstrate that populist support is primarily driven
by once culturally predominant groups’ cultural back-
lash against progressive social value change, or the dis-
placement of traditional cultural norms and privileges
(Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 3). The authors use expert
surveys of the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to
identify the ideological location of 268 political parties
in 31 European countries and combine these data with
national-level European party competition and the Euro-
pean Social Survey (2002–2014) to examine the cross-
national evidence at individual level for the impact of
the economic insecurity and cultural values as predic-
tors of voting for populist parties. While the economic
security theory, which views changes in the workforce
in post-industrial economies responsible for populist par-
ties’ rise, gets inconsistent support, they find consistent
evidence for the cultural backlash theory. Rising levels of
economic insecurity may have their share. Yet, populist
parties’ rise above all reflect “a reaction against a wide
range of rapid cultural changes that seem to be eroding
the basic values and customs of Western societies” (In-
glehart & Norris, 2016, p. 30).
While offering an important empirical account of
the cultural backlash, the authors fall short of further
theorizing its causes beyond suggesting that rapid cul-
tural change “catalyzed culture wars” (Inglehart & Norris,
2016). Within the context of modernization theory, the
backlash may then appear as a transitory phenomenon,
a temporary “bump in the road” of socio-cultural mod-
ernization expressed by what Inglehart and Norris see to
be an ethnocentric, partly agingwhite culturalminority—
rather than conceiving the backlash in the context of
reproduction of stable, resilient authoritarian legacies
and cultural undercurrents within liberal democracies.
A critical cultural theorizing of their empirical findings
would also have to thoroughly reflect on underlying
socio-economic origins facilitating wishes for cultural clo-
sure and exclusive identity—such as a structural crisis
of global capitalist economic modernization that may
undermine further socio-cultural modernization and de-
mocratization.11 Finally, the authors say little about the
depth of the divide fueling cultural value and identity
conflicts, and authoritarian populist challenges to liberal
democracy, which seems to currently have lost some of
its cultural appeal.12
Indeed, the forceful, noisy cultural counter-revolu-
tion seems to correlate with eroding trust in democratic
institutions and laws, and declining support for liberal
democracy. Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk view
an increasingly large pool for authoritarian populists as
a sign of “democratic deconsolidation” (Foa & Mounk,
2016).13 They suggest, contrary to Inglehart and Norris,
that such disaffection with liberal democracy (and its
culture) especially affects the youngest generational co-
horts. While, for instance, 55% of Dutch citizens born be-
fore WWII accredited maximum importance to living in
a democracy, only one in three millennials do so (Foa &
Mounk, 2016, pp. 7f.).
10 Simon Bornschier (2010a, p. 421) conceptualizes this new divide in terms of a salient conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditional-
communitarian values.
11 To be sure, the authors call for additional robustness tests (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 30). And they concede that the cultural backlash may also be
stimulated by heightened economic insecurity evoked by globalized market capitalism and its crises. Such interactive effects possibly make distinctions
between economic insecurity and cultural backlash somewhat artificial (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 3).
12 Political psychologists Sniderman and Hagendoorn argue that rigid identity politics contributed to a “cultural conflict zone” in the Netherlands. They
point to actual collisions of ways of lives, norms, and values within immigrant societies (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).
13 For a challenge on empirical grounds, see: Alexander & Welzel (2017); Norris (2017); Voeten (2017).
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4. An Authoritarian Cultural Revolt? Explaining the
Populist Counter-Revolution in Context of the Political
Psychology of Authoritarianism
These empirical observations still leave much to be ex-
plained in terms of the underlying causes of the salient
cultural divide, and the genesis of the politico-cultural
backlash today. Which theoretical framework best ex-
plains the diagnosed noisy cultural counter-revolution,
and the acceleratedmomentumof today’s populist politi-
cization of cultural identity and value change? We be-
lieve theorizing and research on the political psychology
of authoritarianism, long ignored in studies on European
populism, can partly help fill this theoretical and empiri-
cal void.
Matthew MacWilliams demonstrates that only one
trait predicts if you are a Trump supporter. According to
MacWilliams, this is not class, race, or age but authoritar-
ianism. It is measured by responses to 4 questions per-
taining to child-bearing: whether it is “more important
for the voter to have a child who is respectful or indepen-
dent; obedient or self-reliant; well-behaved or consider-
ate; and well-mannered or curious” (MacWilliams, 2016).
A study by political psychologist Pettigrew (2017) adds so-
cial dominance and prejudice to authoritarianism as con-
stitutive for populist support. One initial, groundbreaking
work by Hetherington and Weiler traces the recent polit-
ical polarization in American politics to authoritarianism
as an “attractive” explanatory framework (Hetherington
& Weiler, 2009, p. 4). According to the authors, negative
views on issues like immigration and the use of force re-
flect individual levels of authoritarianismand have gained
salience through political decisions. However, while this
important study contributes to a promising, theoretically
grounded understanding of politico-cultural polarization
paving the way for populist politics, it does not engage
with populism, let alone populism in Europe. Moreover,
it draws major inspiration from Adorno and the Frankfurt
School (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, pp. 33–58), yet it
does not fully engagewith their critical-theoretical frame-
work explaining political-psychological dispositions and
dynamics of authoritarian politics.
Turning to the Frankfurt School’s older research on
the political psychology of authoritarianism, the populist
surge in Europe can be theorized as an authoritarian
cultural revolt. Authoritarianism is hereby understood
not just as an ideological feature of populist parties or
attitude among their voters, but also as a multi-faceted
political-psychological binding “glue” unleashed in polit-
ical group dynamics.14 Absorbing Frankfurt School the-
ory, the origins and interactive dynamics at play that
fuel the noisy counter-revolution point to a politically in-
stigated collective rebellion, supported by aggregate indi-
vidual attitudes and psychological dispositions, against
post-industrial liberal democracy and its universalistic,
inclusive, and non-authoritarian cultural underpinnings.
Such revolt may benefit from economic insecurity of vot-
ers and a crisis of legitimacy of established parties and
government, but cannot be reduced to either.
Adorno points to models of politically mobilized, col-
lectively amplified psychological discontent. Adorno’s
theory of the “authoritarian” or “anti-democratic” syn-
drome refers to a psychological disposition linking de-
sires for both authoritarian submission and aggression
to anti-egalitarian ideologies (e.g. antisemitism, nation-
alism, and sexism; Adorno et al., 1950; for a thorough
discussion, see Rensmann, 2017). This syndrome trans-
lates into susceptibility to fantasies of persecution and
conspiracy myths personifying social problems; binary
thinking attributing all personal or societal problems
to alleged “enemies”, in sharp contrast to narcissistic
gains through collective self-aggrandizement of one’s
own group and “cultural identity”; and projections on
perceived “others” of fantasies, anxieties, and social
transgressions otherwise taboo (e.g. viewing immigrants
as rapists)—all of which can be detected in current pop-
ulist mobilizations and their self-reinforcing performa-
tive dynamics (Rensmann, 2017, pp. 321–357; Wodak,
2015, p. 154).
Explaining the appeal of authoritarian-nativist dem-
agogues we find mirrored in today’s populists, Adorno
theorizes these dispositions in the context of a culturally
wide-spread ego weakness present even in consolidated
modern democratic cultures. He views it as being the
product of structural insecurity, social dependence, and
economic pressure experienced by many individuals in
modern societies, which are shaped by abstract forms
of societal domination and forceful socio-economic im-
peratives (Rensmann, 2017, pp. 215–230). According to
Adorno, these socio-cultural conditions engender feel-
ings of cultural alienation and reified, stereotypical per-
ceptions of the social world manifest in the authoritar-
ian syndrome. It implies submissiveness and aggression:
longing for subordinating under a strong, idealized col-
lective and authority figure alongside the denigration of
constructed “enemies” of the (national) group, as well as
the urge to break free from civil rules without breaking
with the social order. According to Adorno’s theory of
authoritarian rebellion (Rensmann, 2017, pp. 127–132),
populists may offer exactly these particular, tribalistic
and aggressive forms of emotional gratification and psy-
chological bonding that authoritarian subjects and mi-
lieus look for, rather than economic gains: Releasing ver-
bal authoritarian aggression by lashing out against those
seen as “different”, “alien”, “weak” or “dangerous” oth-
ers (all present in the imagery portraying refugees), while
14 A recent exploratory study by Rooduijn (2014) on Dutch voters confirms that authoritarianism is part of the attitudinal complex of radical right
populist voters, but does not employ authoritarianism as an explanatory theoretical framework.
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promising to restore forceful sanctioning authority and
elevate the in-group, “the good people”, by bringing back
past national collective glory and pride.15
Such critical theorizing of the populist surge as an
authoritarian cultural revolt against the alleged cultural
weakness of liberal democracy may help understand the
admiration for Putin’s autocratic leadership in Russia by
both populist voters and parties like the AfD or Front
National. It may also help explain why provocative vio-
lations of civil liberal norms, discursive boundaries, and
even legal ones by populists—their willingness to break
the rules and cultural taboos—do not seem to alien-
ate but rather attract populist core voters, as a study
of Trump loyalists shows (Carter & Johnston Conover,
2017). Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey understand
this “coarsening of political discourse” in disregard of
“‘appropriate’ ways of acting in the political realm” as
a core element of what they conceptualize as “populist
political style” (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, p. 392). Con-
stantly challenging the public “boundaries of the speak-
able” (Rensmann, 2006), the dynamics of a new type
of disruptive politics of transgression have already trans-
formed political cultures. For instance, the Dutch pop-
ulist Wilders provoked a ruling by a regional court that
found him guilty of inflammatory speech against Mus-
lims, only to enjoy media attention for blaming the le-
gal system and lamenting infringement of free speech
(Adam, 2016). In reference to chancellor Merkel, AfD
politicians proclaim “We’ll lock up the old bitch”, express-
ing vulgar authoritarian punishment fantasies against a
denigrated political elite and migrants.
Seen in this theoretical framework, the current immi-
gration crisis which has coincided with populist electoral
gains is less a cause for successful populist mobilization
than an opportunity for politically unleashing existing au-
thoritarian dispositions and anti-cosmopolitan cultural
identity constructs among significantmilieus. Since 2015,
the European refugee crisis in the wake of the civil war in
Syria helped further boost the authoritarian-nativist cul-
tural backlash, and publicly transform it into a noisy polit-
ical rebellion. This is especially the case in countries like
Germany, where many migrants were able to find refuge
(Ostrand, 2015).16 However, European surveys that in-
clude countries hardly affected by the refugee crisis, such
as Poland or the UK (Ostrand, 2015, p. 273), also show
wide-spread opposition to new migration. In a recent
PEW survey in 10 major European countries, 59% of re-
spondents are concerned that the influx of refugees “will
increase the threat of domestic terrorism”, with majori-
ties holding this view in 8 of 10 countries. Strikingly, only
aminority thinks that “growing diversity makes the coun-
try a better place to live”, including such culturally di-
verse countries like the Netherlands (17%), the UK (33%),
and France (26%) (Poushter, 2016).
Even though mass immigration matters, problems
with politico-cultural inclusion exist, and the threat from
Islamist terrorism is a serious policy issue, these cross-
national data indicate that underlying, authoritarian-
nativist cultural perceptions play a major role, partly in-
dependent of actual migration numbers and the pres-
ence of (Muslim) immigrants. Following our argument,
these data can serve as indicators of an affectively
charged politico-cultural divide in society on issues of
collective identity, diversity, and cosmopolitan social
value change—by now largely overshadowing other
cleavages among voters—and a consolidated, proliferat-
ing culture of authoritarian aggressions and transgres-
sions expressed by populist actors and other counter-
revolutionary groups on squares, demonstrations, and
social media. Indeed, the authoritarian backlash today
in defense of a particular, exclusive conception of na-
tional cultural identity is often articulated with regard to
fear of an increasing influence of Muslims and Islam—
and at times in apocalyptic terms. The populist wish to
“restore” a pure, ethnic national identity and to “take
back our country and Volk” (as cited in Cohen, 2017) is
thereby frequently linked to calls for “de-Islamization”
(Geert Wilders, as cited in Cannane, 2017)—if need be
by authoritarian measures. “Globalist” Jews also often
serve as imagined subversive “enemies” of cultural iden-
tity; occasionally they are construed as string-pullers
behind Muslim migration—the authoritarian populist
prime minister of Hungary makes this claim against the
Jewish billionaire George Soros (Gorondi, 2017; see also
Rensmann, 2011).17
5. Reconfigured Political Conflict in the Digital Age:
Post-Factual Transgressions on Social Media as Cultural
Facilitators of Populist Politics
The question about changing cultural conditions favor-
able for authoritarian populist mobilizations points to an-
15 Authoritarianism as an explanatory framework for populist success seems especially useful in view of the disproportionate success of populist parties
in post-authoritarian, post-Communist contexts, like PiS in Poland, Fidesz in Hungary. In the 2017 elections the AfD became the strongest party in Saxony
and generally considerably more electorally successful in former East Germany (21.5%), still shaped by authoritarian cultural legacies, than in former
West Germany.
16 In the 2017 elections, for instance, the new German populist party AfD gained massively among former non-voters across the country, and especially
in authoritarian-nativist strongholds in East Germany still marred by authoritarian, anti-democratic legacies. But it also collected large shares in some
West German towns locally dealing with the refugee crisis, where refugees became the no. 1 topic—such as Deggendorf in Bavaria, where 31.5% voted
for the right-wing populists (Osel, 2017).
17 It is noteworthy that there is some variation in the rhetoric mobilized by European populist parties on Islam. Some actors, like Geert Wilders, claim
that they in fact protect European liberal values and gender equality against an illiberal Islam (Zúquete, 2008). Rogers Brubaker calls this “civilization-
ism” (Brubaker, 2017). Yet such seemingly pro-liberal defenses of liberal-egalitarian norms are deceptive insofar as they are regularly intermingled with
ethnicized myths of cultural superiority and inferiority, and accompanied by racialized stereotypes of Muslims as essentially “culturally incompatible”
with European societies—labeling Muslims collectively as dangerous extremists or as rapists. This betrays the grounding of such populist rhetoric in
the authoritarian, anti-liberal and anti-cosmoplitan side of the cultural divide, rather than being an expression of a liberal-secular critique of politi-
cal Islam(ism).
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other interrelated field of inquiry beyond conventional
frameworks for the study of party politics. Findings from
political sociology on the cultural appeal of a counter-
revolutionary backlashmobilized by populists should not
only be linked to research on the political psychology
of authoritarianism to better theorize the scope and
depth of this appeal. Understanding the transformed en-
vironment engendering, reinforcing and polarizing the
divide on social values and cultural identity also means
paying attention to the role of social media and digi-
tal publics. It requires theoretically and empirically in-
tegrating research from media studies on changed com-
municative conditions of politics. Arguments on the rel-
evance of social media bubbles and fake news dissem-
inated through new digital media have gained promi-
nence in recent debates about populism. But these ar-
guments have yet to resonate in broader systematic re-
search on this link. While the precise relations of pop-
ulist communication and social media have hardly been
researched yet, first quantitative studies of populist com-
munication strategies show that populist parties make
disproportionate use of Facebook and Twitter (Ernst, En-
gesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017; on initial work on
populism and new media see Coretti & Pica, 2015; Maz-
zoleni, 2008; Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, &
de Vreese, 2017; Wirth et al., 2016).
Three initial insights from research on the implica-
tions of new digital media on conditions of political com-
munication seem particularly relevant for both refram-
ing the study of populism and theorizing the profoundly
changed cultural conditions for its impact: First, dis-
intermediating technologies like Facebook and Twitter
increasingly replace newspapers and other media serv-
ing as intermediaries between politics and citizens. This
transforms patterns of political interaction and publicity
inmultiple ways. Social media can have democratizing ef-
fects on public discourse because they engender imme-
diate fact-checking by civil society actors, increasing the
political accountability of those who hold public office.
Social media also “have the potential to favor citizens’ ac-
tivism”, enable regular citizens to actively participate in
public debates and offer “free networked space” for and
between political actors and non-actors (Ceron, 2017, pp.
179, 197f.). Yet studies have shown that social media can
also, at least for ideologically and culturally predisposed
groups and audiences, generate non-pluralistic arenas:
self-referential and segregated publics in which particu-
lar world-views are affirmed and reinforced. Rather than
facilitating rational deliberation about policies across a
large public spectrum, social media can have constrain-
ing ideological effects and limit genuine debate between
competing views; favorable to populist rhetoric, which is
shaped by constructed group dichotomies, communica-
tion tends to be shaped by fragmentation and polariza-
tion (Ceron, 2017, p. 198). Digital media may thus add
to centrifugal tendencies of polarization in political life—
and the breakdown of the public into fragmented, non-
pluralistic, and biased micro-publics warped in closed
world-views.18
Second, recent communication studies show that the
rhetorics of horizontalism regarding social media plat-
forms often hide vertical structures and inequalities. This
has been demonstrated in the case of the Italian populist
movement-partyMovimento Cinque Stelle led by Beppe
Grillo. While glorifying social media technology, it masks
authoritarian, intransparent techniques (Coretti, 2014).
Moreover, both Facebook and Google have boosted, ar-
guably involuntarily, fake news sites in the past, including
prominently Sputnik and Russia Today, which spread dis-
information in the service of the authoritarian Russian
government. Communications scholars have analyzed in-
transparencies, including algorithms subject to manipu-
lation (Coretti & Pica, 2015, p. 316; Treré & Barassi, 2015,
p. 299). There is mounting evidence that Russia, in ad-
dition to overt support for European populists, used cy-
berwar techniques on social media, interfering with fake
news and “bots” (fake automatized accounts) on Twitter
and Facebook on behalf of populist electoral campaigns
in America, France, and Germany—with the presumed
goal of destabilizing democracies (Röpcke, 2017; Rotella,
2017; Shane, 2017).
Third, Dahlgren (2005) observed already more than
a decade ago negative effects of new digital media on
civic cultural norms, alongside effects of transnational
critical publicity. Recent studies validate the claim that
especially social media discourses have engendered the
growth of unfiltered hate speech and verbal violence, as
well as post-factual claims and conspiracy myths both
from below, or bottom up, and top down from spon-
sored (fake) news sites—often articulated anonymously
and spreading instantaneously (Ceron, 2017, p. 1). Cir-
cumventing traditional media and their discursive filters,
both social media and populist politics boost the poli-
tics of transgression (see Reinemann et al., 2017)—the
latter often with the help of social media, as a study
by Krämer (2017) on populist online practices shows.
In addition to evading established media and develop-
ing a populist identity and ideology, main functions in-
clude justifying the hitherto socially illegitimate exclu-
sion of outgroups (Krämer, 2017). Framing politics in
terms of friends and enemies, they constantly challenge
and have eroded the boundaries of “legitimate” or ac-
ceptable political discourse and civil norms. This includes
the expansion of vulgarity, fear-mongering, authoritar-
ian aggression and ad hominem intimidation, and for-
merly discredited social resentments.19 Stylizing them-
selves as audacious “taboo-breakers” of an allegedly sti-
fled public debate, populists often stage provocations
to draw attention while pretending to be the “voice of
the people” victimized by liberal media and “elite opin-
18 Catering to specialized audiences, social media and websites assess preferences and encourage citizens to narrowly filter information they receive
and speak only to the like-minded (Sunstein, 2009).
19 See for an analysis of these features within populist discourse Wodak (2015).
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ion”. They frequently employ social media to “break the
rules”, which constitutes part of their cultural attraction
(Krämer, 2017; Reinemann et al., 2017).
Not surprisingly, populist actors often praise social
media for empowering the voice of the “real people” and
enabling them to speak “truth” directly to the people
without interference—in contrast to information from
the allegedly “lying” “establishment media”, in part por-
trayed as “enemies of the people” (D. Trump).20 Be that
as it may, the destabilization of facticity through new
digital media seems particularly beneficial to simplifi-
cations, falsehoods, and ideological binaries employed
by populist actors. The culture of post-factual claims on
proliferating fake news sites, which spread falsifications
and invented facts and benefit from wide-spread lack of
information literacy (Stanford History Education Group,
2016), undermines democratic political culture, which re-
quires factual grounding.21 It can be theorized that the
ubiquitous political relativization, inversion, and destabi-
lization of factual truth on social media also further ad-
vances the polarization of politico-cultural conflict, inso-
far as truth is increasingly seen as either unrecognizable
or irrelevant among groups of voters as long as claims
support one’s ideological cause or political convictions.
This process coincides with declining trust in established
news sources and mainstream media over the last two
decades (Swift, 2016).
How the changed media environment specifically in-
teracts with the rise of a populist and authoritarian-
nativist cultural counter-revolution needs to be further
theorized and studied, both in its micro-mechanisms
and broader cultural impact, i.e. to determine under
what specific conditions communication dynamics in
digital publics broaden the cultural opportunity struc-
tures of populist politics (Koopmans &Muis, 2009; Rens-
mann, 2011).
6. Conclusion: Towards a Cultural Turn in the Study of
Populist Politics
The article has argued for a cultural turn in the study
of populist politics in Europe. It proposed an ideologi-
cal reconceptualization of populist actors, focusing on
their long underestimated, yet constitutive cultural ap-
peal and identity. Synthesizing, linking and integrating in-
sights that originate in three adjacent fields—political so-
ciology, political psychology, and media studies—we fur-
thermore sought to advance a novel, multi-disciplinary
perspective to theorize cultural conditions and dynamics
at play in current trans-national populist successes.
The suggested theoretical framework conceives pop-
ulist parties primarily as expressions and facilitators of
a long lingering, now noisy, authoritarian-nativist cul-
tural counter-revolution. They thrive on and mobilize
a significant cultural backlash that is directed against
cultural inclusion and progressive cosmopolitan social
value change—as well as “others” and elites represent-
ing such change. As we have argued based on sociolog-
ical empirical indicators, this counter-revolution reflects
deep-seated, increasingly salient and politicized cultural
conflicts about values, identities, and loyalties in Euro-
pean democracies: a great divide grounded in cultural
and social values that largely trumps economic cleav-
ages. The proposed theoretical framework hereby at-
tributes a key explanatory role to the political psychol-
ogy of authoritarianism—longmarginalized in studies on
populism—and its cultural undercurrents within Euro-
pean societies. The populist surge can be theorized as
an authoritarian revolt forcefully expressing cultural dis-
content within and against modern liberal democracies.
New research from media studies contributes to under-
standing this revolt and its transgressions as engendered
by profoundly transformed communicative conditions in
the digital age: they help erode standards of civil and fac-
tual discourse and benefit populist mobilizations.
To be sure, research on changed cultural conditions
needs to take into account political factors that have con-
tributed to the accelerated rise of illiberal populist actors
and politics, and deserve further study. The sensed cri-
sis of democratic legitimacy, which populist actors seek
to exploit, may also be linked to mainstream parties’
technocratic or failed policy responses to societal chal-
lenges (Taub, 2017). These include neo-liberal welfare
state regress and widening social inequalities advanced
by mainstream parties over the last two decades, inade-
quate attempts to develop sound, humane refugee and
immigration policies, and failure to provide effective re-
sponses to political Islamism and terrorism—which do
constitute real threats to citizens, denizens, and immi-
grants seeking civil rights and freedom in cosmopoli-
tan immigration societies. Moreover, the reconfigured
politico-cultural conflicts analyzedmay have been fueled
by parts of a culturalist left and radical religious groups
who promote anti-cosmopolitan, illiberal politics that rel-
ativize human rights in the name of cultural identity, thus
displaying affinities with identity politics of authoritar-
ian populists.
The diagnosed noisy cultural counter-revolution mo-
bilized by populist actors and the cultural conditions that
contribute to their current success also need further,
multi-disciplinarily grounded theorizing, aswell as the ro-
bust operationalization and testing of hypotheses on dis-
tinct culture(s) of populism in the future. We still know
too little: about the scope and origins of the salient,
20 Within democracies, the Orwellian inversion in relation to news media is especially practiced by the authoritarian populist U.S. President Trump, who
primarily communicates via Twitter. Attacking renowned news sources as “the Fake News Media” (in capital letters) he, emblematic also for European
populists, suggests being victimized by news media: “Only the Fake News Media and Trump enemies want me to stop using social media (110 million
people). Only way for me to get the truth out” (as cited in Jackson, 2017).
21 Openness to processing factual information and accepting facts are arguably minimum requirements for democracy to work. Many populists and fake
news sites, however, seek leveling out differences between fact, opinion, and falsehood and promote “alternative facts” (Kellyanne Conway, Counselor
to the U.S. President).
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emotionally charged divide on socio-cultural values and
identities, the grievances and conflicting forces in play,
and the role of underlying socio-economic factors—such
as rising economic insecurity and inequality—potentially
contributing to the longing for cultural closure and value
change reversal. The same applies to the emotional grat-
ifications of what we have theorized as an authoritarian
revolt, anchored in wide-spread psychological disposi-
tions and amplified by transgressions of politico-cultural
boundaries on social media. However, we believe that
a better understanding of the cultural dynamics of pop-
ulism will also help to assess its potential effects on the
future of democracies in Europe and beyond.
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